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BOOK Set theory INC# based on intuitionistic logic with
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Preface
In this book set theory INC# based on intuitionistic logic with restricted modus ponens
rule is proposed. It proved that intuitionistic logic with restricted modus ponens rule can
to safe Cantor naive set theory from a triviality. Similar results for paraconsistent set
theories were obtained in author papers [13]-[16].
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1.Remarks on Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZFC.
Considering only pure sets, the naive set comprehension principle says, for any
condition, that there is a set containing all and only the sets satisfying this condition. In
first-order logic, this can be formulated as the following schematic principle, where ϕ
may be any formula in whichy does not occur freely:
yxx  y  ϕ. 1.1
Russell’s paradox shows that the instance obtained by letting ϕ be x  x is
inconsistent in classical logic. One response to the paradox is to restrict naive set
comprehension by ruling out this and other problematic instances: only for each of some
special conditions is it claimed there is a set containing all and only the sets satisfying
the condition. Many well known set theories can be understood as instances of this
generic response,differing in how they understand special.For example,the axiom
schema of separation (1.1) in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC) restricts set
comprehension to conditions which contain, as a conjunct, the condition of being a
member of some given set:
yxx  y  ϕ  x  z. 1.2
Similarly, in Quine’s New Foundations (NF) set comprehension is restricted to
conditions which are stratified, where ϕ is stratified just in case there is a mapping f from
individual variables to natural numbers such that for each subformula of ϕ of the form
x  y, fy  fx  1 and for each subformula of ϕ of the form x  y, fx  fy. Both of
these responses block Russell’s paradox by ruling out the condition x  x. Must every
restriction of naive comprehension take the form of simply ruling out certain instances?
In this article, I have suggest and explore a different approach. As we have
seen,standard set comprehension axioms restrict attention to some special conditions:
for each of these special conditions, they provide for the existence of a set containing all
and only the sets which satisfy it.
Instead of restricting the conditions one is allowed to consider, we propose restricting
the way in which the sets in question satisfy a given condition: for every condition, our
comprehension axiom will assert the existence of a set containing all and only the sets
satisfying that condition in a special way using intuitionistic first-order logic with restricted
modus ponens rule.
2.Russell’s paradox resolution using intuitionistic first-order
logic with restricted modus ponens rule.
2.1.Russell’s paradox
The comprehension principle (1.1) for the condition x  x gives
xx    x  x. 2.1
Thus  is the set whose members are exactly those sets that are not members of
themselves. It follows from (2.1)
      . 2.2 Is  a member of itself? If
it is,i.e.   then it must satisfy the condition of not being a member of itself and so it
is not,i.e.  . If it is not, then it must not satisfy the condition of not being a member
of itself, and so it must be a member of itself. Since by classical logic only one case or
the other one must hold – either  is a member of itself or it is not – it follows that the
theory implies a contradiction known as Russell’s paradox discovered by Bertrand
Russell in 1901, see [1]-[6].
Remark 2.1.Remind classical logic mandates that any contradiction trivializes a theory
by making every sentence of the theory provable. This is because, in classical logic, the
following is a theorem:
Ex Falso Quodlibet : A  A  B. 2.3
Remark 2.2.Now, virtually the only way to avoid EFQ is to give up disjunctive
syllogism




that is, given the usual definitions of the connectives, modus ponens! So altering basic
sentential logic in this way is radical indeed – but possible.
Remark 2.3.Unfortunately, even giving up EFQ is not enough to retain a semblance of
naive Cantor set theory (NC). One also has to give up the following additional theorem
of basic sentential logic:
Contraction: A  A  B  A  B. 2.5
It can then be argued that NC leads directly, not merely to an isolated contradiction,
but to triviality. For the argument that this is so,see Curry’s paradox [7].
Thus it seems that the woes of NC are not confined to Russell’s paradox but also
include a negation-free paradox due to Curry.
Remark 2.4. Another suggestion might be to conclude that the paradox depends upon
an instance of the principle of Excluded Middle, that either  is a member of  or it is
not. This is a principle that is rejected by some non-classical approaches to logic,
including intuitionism [8].
Remind that in classical logic, we often discuss the truth values that a formula can
take the values are usually chosen as the members of a Boolean algebra. The meet and
join operations in the Boolean algebra are identified with the  and  logical connectives,
so that the value of a formula of the form A  B is the meet of the value of A and the
value of B in the Boolean algebra. Then we have the useful theorem that a formula is a
valid proposition of classical logic if and only if its value is 1 for every valuation-that is,
for any assignment of values to its variables. A corresponding theorem is true for
intuitionistic logic, but instead of assigning each formula a value from a Boolean algebra,
one uses values from an Heyting algebra, of which Boolean algebras are a special case.
A formula is valid (or holds) in intuitionistic logic if and only if it receives the value of the
top element for any valuation on any Heyting algebra. It can be shown that to recognize
valid formulas, it is sufficient to consider a single Heyting algebra whose elements are
the open subsets of the real line  [8]. In this algebra we have: (1) Value  ,(2)
Value  , (3) ValueA  B  ValueA 	 ValueB,
(4)ValueA  B  ValueA 
 ValueB, (5)
ValueA  B  Int ValueA 
 ValueB ,(6) ValueA  Int ValueA ,where
IntX is the interior of X and X its complement.
Remark 2.5. With these assignments (1)-(6), intuitionistically valid formulas are
precisely
those that are assigned the value of the entire line [8]. For example, the formula
A  A is valid,since ValueA  A  .So the valuation of this formula is true,
and indeed the formula is valid. But the law of the excluded middle, A  A, can be
easily
shown to be invalid by using a specific value of the set of positive real numbers for A :
ValueA  x|x  0  .For such A one obtains ValueA  A  .
We do now as follows:
Case I.Assume now that: (a)    holds,i.e.Value     and therefore   
is
not holds,since Value    .
From (2.2) it follows that (b)       .From (a) and (b) by modus ponens rule
it
follows that
  ,          . 2.6
From (2.6) and (a) one obtains the following formula       . But by the Law
of
Non-contradiction we know that       .Thus we obtain a contradiction
and
therefore    is not holds.
Case II.Assume now that:
(a)    holds,i.e.Value     and therefore    is
not holds,since Value    .
From (2.2) it follows that (b)       .From (a) and (b) by modus ponens rule
it
follows that
  ,          . 2.7
From (2.7) and (b) one obtains the following formula       . But by the Law
of
Non-contradiction we know that       .Thus we obtain a contradiction
and
therefore    is not holds. Thus bouth    and    is not holds, but by
absent
the Excluded Middle but by absent the law Excluded Middle this does not pose any
problems.
Remark 2.6. However it well known that it is possible to derive the contradiction only
from
the statement (2.2) i.e.,       . We do so as follows:
Assume now that:        holds and therefore       . But
we also know that       .So           .
But by the Law of Non-contradiction we know that       
So by modus tollens we conclude that   .
At the same time we also know that       , and thus by modus ponens
we conclude that   .
So we can deduce both    and its negation    using only intuitionistically
acceptable methods.
Remark 2.7. Another suggestion might be to conclude that the paradox depends upon
an instance of the Law of Non-contradiction, that       . This is a
principle
that is rejected by some non-classical approaches to logic,including paraconsistent
logic
[9].Nevertheless even paraconsistent logic can not safe NC from a triviality [9].
Da Costa’s paraconsistent set theories of type NFC and NFnC, 1  n  . has been
studying A.I. Arruda [9].
Remind that the main postulates of NFC are the following [9]:
I.Extensionality
xx    x      . 2.8
II.Abstraction
xx    Fx, 2.9
where  does not occur free in Fx and Fx is stratified or it does not contain any
formula of the form A  B.
A.I. Arruda has been proved that da Costa’s formulation of the axiom schema of
abstraction (2.9) for the systems NFn, 1  n  , leads to the trivialization of the
systems, see [9].
Remark 2.8.Note that in NFC, the restrictions regarding the use of non-stratified
formulas obstruct a direct proof of the paradox of Curry. Russell’s set , defined as
	xx  x, exists as well as many other non-classical sets. The paradox of Russell in the
form        is derivable but apparently, it causes no ham to the system.
Due to its weakness, the primitive negation of NFC,, is almost useless for
set-theoretical purposes. Thus, let us define
~A for A  xyx  y  x  y. 2.10
The universal set V is defined as 	xx  x, the empty set  as x|~x  x,and the
complement of a set , , as x|~x  a.
Theorem 2.1.[8]. In NFC,~ is a minimal intuitionistic negation.
Corollary 2.1.  A  ~A  ~B,  A  B  ~B  ~A.
Corollary 2.2. All the theorems of NF whose proofs depend only on the laws of the
minimal intuitionistic first-order logic with equality and on the postulates of
extensionality
and abstraction of NF are valid in NFC.
Theorem 2.2.[9].(Cantor’s Theorem) NFC  ~  P.
Corollary2.3[9].(Cantor’s Paradox) NFC  V  PV  ~V  PV.
Remark 2.9.Note that Cantor’s paradox does not trivialize NFC, since from A and A
we cannot obtain any formula B whatsoever. For instance, apparently, we cannot
obtain
any formula of the form B, where B is a nonatomic formula.
Theorem 5.3.(Paradox of identity) [9].(i) NFC      ~  ,(ii)
NFC      ~  ,
(iii) NFC      ~  .
Proof. By the corollaries 2.1 and 2.2, we obtain
x  x  ,
        
2.11
Thus, as x  x, then   . By the same corollaries we also obtain
~  .The proof of part (ii) is similar to that of part (i). Part (iii) is an
immediate consequence of part (ii).
Remark 2.10.The paradox of identity obviously trivialized paraconsistent set theory
NFC.
Thus paraconsistent logics cannot resolved the problem.
2.2.The restricted rules of inference.
1.The restricted modus ponens rule.
The canonical (unrestricted) modus ponens rule may be written in sequent notation as
P,P  Q MP Q, 2.8
where P,Q and P  Q are statements (or propositions) in a formal language  and
MP
is a metalogical symbol meaning that Q is a syntactic consequence of P and P 	 Q in
some logical system,see [10]-[11].






The validity of modus ponens in classical two-valued logic can be clearly
demonstrated by use of a truth table.In instances of modus ponens we assume as
premises that P  Q is true and P is true. Only one line of the truth table1-the
first-satisfies these two conditions: P and P  Q. On this line, Q is also true. Therefore,
whenever P  Q is true and P is true, Q must also be true.
Let wff  wff be a set of the all wff’s corresponding to formal language .
The restricted modus ponens rule RMP may be written in sequent notation as
P,P  Q RMP Q iff P  




2  wff.Therefore the restricted modus ponens rule RMP meant that
P,P  Q RMP Q 2.10
if P  
1or P  Q  
2 or P  
1  P  Q  
2.
2.The restricted disjunction elimination rule.
In propositional logic, canonical (unrestricted) disjunctive syllogism or modus tollendo
ponens (MTP) also known as disjunction elimination rule. The rule makes it possible to
eliminate a disjunction from a logical proof. It is the rule that:
P  Q,P MTP Q 2.11
and can be expressed by truth-functional tautology of propositional logic:
P  Q  P  Q 2.12
The restricted disjunction elimination rule RMTP may be written in sequent notation as
P  Q,P RMTP Q iff P  




2  wff. In additional we set P  Q  P  
1and
P  Q  P  Q  
2 iff P  
1and Q  
2.Therefore the restricted disjunction
elimination rule RMTP meant that
P  Q,P RMTP Q 2.14
iff P  
1or Q  
2 or P  
1  Q  
2.
3.The restricted modus tollens rule.
The canonical (unrestricted) modus tollens rule may be written in sequent notation as
P  Q,Q MT  P, 2.15
where MT is a metalogical symbol meaning that P is a syntactic consequence of
P  Q and Q in some logical system; or by the statement of a functional tautology
of propositional logic:
P  Q  Q  P. 2.16
The validity of modus tollens can be clearly demonstrated through a truth table1.
In instances of the canonical modus tollens we assume as premises that P  Q is
true and Q is false. There is only one line of the truth table1-the fourth line-which
satisfies these two conditions. In this line, P is false. Therefore, in every instance in
which P  Q is true and Q is false, P must also be false.The restricted modus tollens
rule may be written in sequent notation as
P  Q,Q RMT  P iff P  Q  




2  wff.Therefore the restricted modus tollens rule meant that
P  Q,Q RMT  P 2.18
if P  Q  
1 or Q  
2 or P  Q  
1   Q  
2 .
2.3.Curry’s paradox resolution using bivalent logic with
restricted modus ponens rule.
In set theories that allow unrestricted comprehension, we can nevertheless prove any
logical statement 	 by examining the set
X  x|x  x  	.
Assuming that  takes precedence over both  and , the proof proceeds as
follows:
1. X  x|x  x  	 [Definition of X]
2. x  X  x  x  X  X [Substitution of equal sets in membership]
3. x  X  x  x  	  X  X  	
[Addition of a consequent to both sides of a biconditional (from 2)]
4. X  X  X  X  	 [Law of concretion (from 1 and 3)]
5. X  X  X  X  	 [Biconditional elimination (from 4)]
6. X  X  	 [Contraction (from 5)]
7. X  X  	  X  X [Biconditional elimination (from 4)]
8. X  X [Unrestricted modus ponens UMP (from 6 and 7)]
9.	 [Unrestricted Modus ponens UMP (from 8 and 6)] since
X  X,X  X  	 UMP 	.
Curry’s paradox violated NC since any 	 statement is provable.Therefore, in a
consistent set theory, the set x  x  x 	 	 does not exist for false 	 such that
0  1,etc.Some proposals for set theory have attempted to deal with Curry’s paradox
not by restricting the rule of comprehension, but by restricting the deduction rules of
canonical logic [7]. The existence of proofs like the one above shows that at least one
of
the deduction rules used in the proof above must be restricted.
It is clear that in order to avoid Curry’s paradox only modus ponens rule must be
restricted as mentioned above in subsection 2.2.
Let LP# be bivalent predicate calculus with restricted modus ponens rule. Let NC#
be Cantor set theory with unrestricted comprehension and equiped with bivalent
predicate calculus LP#.Let #  #NC# be formal lenguage corresponding to
set theory NC#. Let wff
#  wff
# # be a set of the all closed wff’s of the lenguage #.
Let X	 be a set X	  x|x  x  	,where 	  wff
# .
X  x|x  x  	.
Assuming that  takes precedence over both  and , the proof proceeds as
follows:
1. X	  x|x  x  	 [Definition of X]
2. x  X	  x  x  X	  X	 [Substitution of equal sets in membership]
3. x  X	  x  x  	  X	  X	  	
[Addition of a consequent to both sides of a biconditional (from 2)]
4. X	  X	  X	  X	  	 [Law of concretion (from 1 and 3)]
5. X	  X	  X	  X	  	 [Biconditional elimination (from 4)]
6. X	  X	  	 [Contraction (from 5)]
7. X	  X	  	  X	  X	 [Biconditional elimination (from 4)]
8. X	  X	 [Unrestricted modus ponens UMP (from 6 and 7)]
Let 
1be a set of the all closed wff’s corresponding to lenguage wff
# such that

  0  1 
 	|	  0  1.
Let 
1be a set of the all closed wff’s 	 corresponding to lenguage wff
# such that
	  X	  X	 with 	  
.Let 
2 be a set of the all closed wff’s 	
corresponding to lenguage wff
# such that 	  X	  X	  	 with 	  
.
Thus from X	  X	 and X	  X	  	, we conclude 	 if and only if
X	  X	  





3.Russell’s paradox resolution using intuitionistic first-order
logic with restricted modus ponens rule.
3.1. The intuitionistic propositional calculus Pp# with
restricted modus ponens rule.
The first step in the metamathematical study of any part of logic or mathematics is to
specify a formal language . For propositional or sentential logic, the standard language
has denumerably many distinct proposition letters P0,P1,P2, . . . and symbols &, ,	,,
for the propositional connectives “and,” “or,” “if ...then,” and “not” respectively, with left
and right parentheses , (sometimes written “[, ]” for ease of reading). Classical logic
actually needs only two connectives (since classical  and 	 can be defined in terms of
& and ), but the four intuitionistic connectives are independent. The classical language
is thus properly contained in the intuitionistic, which is more expressive. The most
important tool of metamathematics is generalized induction, a method Brouwer
endorsed. The class of wff’s (well-formed formulas) of the language Pp# of Pp# is
defined inductively by the rules:
(i) Each proposition letter is a (prime) formula.
(ii) If A,B are formulas so are A&B,A  B,A 	 B and A.
(iii) Nothing is a formula except as required by (i) and (ii).
(iv)The class of wff’s of the language Pp# we will denoted by wffPp#.
As in classical logic, A  B abbreviates A 	 B&B 	 A.
The axioms are all formulas of the following forms:
Pp# 1. A 	 B 	 A.
Pp# 2. A 	 B 	 A 	 B 	 C 	 A 	 C.
Pp# 3. A 	 B 	 A&B.
Pp# 4. A&B 	 A.
Pp# 5.A&B 	 B.
Pp# 6. A 	 A  B.
Pp# 7. B 	 A  B.
Pp# 8. A 	 C 	 B 	 C 	 A  B 	 C.
Pp# 9. A 	 B 	 A 	 B 	 A.
Pp#10. A 	 A 	 B.
Pp#11.  	 A.
Remark 3.1.The system of classical logic is obtained by adding any one of the
following axioms: 1.ϕ   ϕ (Law of the excluded middle. May also be formulated as
ϕ 	 χ 	  ϕ 	 χ 	 χ
2.  ϕ 	 ϕ (Double negation elimination)
ϕ 	 χ 	 ϕ 	 ϕ (Peirce’s law)
 ϕ 	  χ 	 χ 	 ϕ (Law of contraposition)
The rules of inference of Pp# is
R#1.RMP (Restricted Modus Ponens).
From A and A 	 B, conclude B iff A  




We abbraviate by A,A 	 B RMP B.
R#2.MT (Restricted Modus Tollens)
P 	 Q,Q RMT P iff P  





If Γ is any collection of formulas and E1, . . . ,Ek any finite sequence of formulas each of
which is a member of Γ, an axiom, or an immediate consequence by RMP of two
preceding formulas, then E1, . . . ,Ek is a derivation in Pp# of its last formula Ek from the
assumptions Γ. We write Γ Pp E to denote that such a derivation exists with Ek  E.
The following theorem is proved by induction over the definition of a derivation; its
converse follows from R#1.
Deduction Theorem. If Γ is any collection of formulas and A,B are any formulas
such that Γ 
 A RMP B, then also Γ RMP A 	 B.
3.2. The intuitionistic first-order predicate calculus Pd# with
restricted modus ponens rule.
The pure firstorder language Pd# has individual variables a1,a2,a3, . . . , and
countably infinitely many distinct predicate letters P1. . .,P2. . .,P3. . ., . . . of arity n for
each n  0,1,2, . . . ,including the 0-ary proposition letters. There are two new logical
symbols  (“for all”) and  (“there exists”). The terms of the language Pd# of Pd# are
the individual variables. The well formed formulas are defined by by the rules:
(i) If P. . . is an n-ary predicate letter and t1, . . . ,tn are terms then Pt1, . . . ,tn is a
(prime) formula.
(ii) If A, B are formulas so are A&B,A  B, A 	 B and A.
(iii) If A is a formula and x an individual variable, then (xA) and (xA) are formulas.
(iv) Nothing else is a formula.
(v) The class of wff’s of the language Pd# we will denoted by wffPd#
We use x,y,z,w,x1,y1, . . . and A,B,C, . . . ,Ax,Ax,y, . . . as metavariables for variables
and formulas, respectively. Anticipating applications (e.g. to arithmetic), s, t,s1, t1, . . . vary
over terms. In omitting parentheses, x and x are treated like . The scope of a
quantifier, and free and bound occurrences of a variable in a formula, are defined as
usual. A formula in which every variable is bound is a sentence or closed formula.
If x is a variable, t a term, and Ax a formula which may or may not contain x free,
then At denotes the result of substituting an occurrence of t for each free occurrence of
x in Ax. The substitution is free if no free occurrence in t of any variable becomes
bound in At; in this case we say t is free for x in Ax.
In addition to Pp1 - Pp11, Pd# has two new axiom schemas, where Ax may be any
formula and t any term free for x in Ax :
Pd#12. xAx 	 At.
Pd#13. At 	 xAx.
The rules of inference are:
R#1.RMP (Restricted Modus Ponens).
From A and A 	 B, conclude B iff A  




We abbraviate R#1 by A,A 	 B RMP B.
R#2.MT (Restricted Modus Tollens)
P 	 Q,Q RMT P iff P  





R#3. From C 	 Ax where x does not occur free in C, conclude C 	 xAx.
R#4. From Ax 	 C where x does not occur free in C, conclude xAx 	 C.
A deduction (or derivation) in Pd# of a formula E from a collection Γ of assumption
formulas is a finite sequence of formulas, each of which is an axiom by Pd#1 - Pd#13, or
a member of Γ, or follows immediately by R#1, R#2 or R#3 from one or two formulas
occurring earlier in the sequence. A proof is a deduction from no assumptions. If Γ is a
collection of sentences and E a formula, the notation Γ RMP E means that a deduction
of E from Γ exists. If Γ is a collection of formulas, we write Γ RMP E only if there is a
deduction of E from Γ in which neither R#2 nor R#3 is used with respect to any variable
free in Γ. With this restriction, the deduction theorem extends to Pd#: If Γ 
 A RMP B
then Γ RMP A 	 B.such that Γ 
 A RMP B, then also Γ RMP A 	 B.
3.3.Russell’s paradox resolution using first-order predicate
calculus Pd# with restricted modus ponens rule.
Assume now that:        holds and therefore       .
Remark 3.2.We set now     
1and         
2.
We also know that       .So           .
But by the Law of Non-contradiction we know that       
So by canonical (unrestricted) modus tollens we conclude that   .
At the same time we also know that       , and thus by restricted modus
ponens we can not conclude that   .
From        we obtain       .We also know that
      .So           .But by the Law of Non-contradiction
we know that       ,
So by unrestricted modus tollens we conclude that    and therefore we obtain
that    &   .We set now     
1 and         
2 ,
and thus by restricted modus tollens we can not conclude that   .
Thus by using calculus Pd# with restricted modus ponens rule and restricted modus
tollens Russell’s paradox dissipears.
4.Intuitionistic Set Theory INC# based on first-order
predicate calculus Pd# with restricted modus ponens rule.
4.1.Axioms and basic definitions.
Intuitionistic set theory INC# is formulated as a system of axioms in the same first
order language as its classical counterpart, only based on intuitionistic logic with
restricted modus ponens rule.. The language of set theory is a first-order language #
with equality , which includes a binary symbol . We write x  y for  x  y and x  y
for xy. Individual variables x,y,z, . . .of # will be understood as ranging over
classical sets. The unique existential quantifier ! is introduced by writing, for any
formula x,!xx as an abbreviation of the formula xx & yy  x  y.#
will also allow the formation of terms of the form x|x, for any formula  containing
the free variable x. Such terms are called nonclassical sets; we shall use upper case
letters A,B, . . . for such sets. For each nonclassical set A  x|x the formulas
xx  A  x and xx  A  x,Ais called the defining axioms for the
nonclassical set A.
Remark 4.1.Note that (1) the formula xx  A  x and
xx  a  x  x  u
is not always asserts that xx  A RMP x and (or) xx RMP x  A even for a
classical set since for some y possible y  A  y RMP y and (or)
y  y  A RMP x  A and y  a  y  y  u RMP y  y  u,etc.In order to
emphasize this fact we often vrite the defining axioms for the nonclassical set in the
following form xx  A w x
Remark 4.2.(1) Two nonclassical sets A,B are defined to be equal and we write A  B
if
xx  A  x  B. (2) A is a subset of B, and we write A 
 B, if xx  A  x  B.
(3) We also write Cl.SetA for the formula uxx  A  x  u. (4) We also write
NCl.SetA for the formulas xx  A  x and xx  A  x,A.
Remark 4.3.Cl.SetA) asserts that the set A is a classical set. For any classical set u,
it follows from the defining axiom for the classical set x|x  u that
Cl.Setx : x  u.
We shall identify x|x  u with u, so that sets may be considered as (special sorts of)
nonclassical sets and we may introduce assertions such as u  A,u 
 A,u  A, etc.
If A is a nonclassical set, we write x  A x,A for xx  A  x,A and
x  Ax,A for xx  A  x,A.
We define now the following sets:
1.u1,u2, . . . ,un  x|x  u1  x  u2 . . .x  un.2. A1,A2, . . . ,An 
 x|x  A1  x  A2 . . .x  An.3.
A  x|yy  A  x  y.
4.	A  x|yy  A  x  y.5.A 
 B  x|x  A  x  B.
5.A 	 B  x|x  A  x  B.6.A  B  x|x  A  x  B.7.u  u 
 u.
8.PA  x|x  A.9.x  A|x,A  x|x  A  x,A.10.V  x|: x  x.
11.  x|x  x.
The system INC# of set theory is based on the following axioms:
Extensionality1: uvxx  u  x  v  u  v











Infinity a  a  x  ax  a
Separation1u1u2, . . .unCl.Setx  a|x,u1,u2, . . . ,un
Separation2u1u2, . . .unNCl.Cl.Setx  A|x,A;u1,u2, . . . ,un.
4.2.Cantor paradox resolution
Theorem 4.1.If the domain T of function F is contained in a set A and if the values of
F
are subsets of A, then the set Z  t  T : t  Ft is not a value of the function F.
Proof. We have to show that for every t  T,Ft  Z. From the definition of the set Z
it
follows that if t  T, then t  Z  t  Ft.Thus if Ft  Z one obtains t  Z  t  Z
and by using unrestricted rules of inference one obtains the
contradiction:t  Z  t  Z.
Theorem 4.2. The set PA is not equipollent to A nor to any subset of A.
For otherwise there would exist a one-to-one function whose domain is a subset of A
and whose range is the family of all subsets of A. But this contradicts Theorem 1.
Theorem 4.3. No two of the sets A,PA,PPA,etc. are equipollent, i.e.
A  PA  PPA,etc. 4.1
Cantor paradox.For universal set from Theorem 4.3 one obtains V  PV .But other
hand one obtains PV  V,since PV  V, but this is a contradiction [12].
Remark 4.4.Note that in order to avoid Cantor paradox one needs to avoid the
inequalities (4.1). The canonical proof of the Theorem 4.3 can to blocked only by using
logic with restricted rules of inference.
I.We assume now that there exists a function Ft such that tFt  Z,i.e.there
exists t
such that the following statement holds
t  Z  t  Z. 4.2
where Z  t  T : t  Ft.
We set now (i) t  Z  
1and (ii) t  Z  t  Z  
2.From (4.1) we know that
t  Z  t  Z. 4.3
So from (4.3) we obtain
t  Z  t  Z  t  Z 4.4
since t  Z  t  Z.But by the Law of Non-contradiction we know that
t  Z  t  Z.
So by canonical (unrestricted) modus tollens rule we conclude that
t  Z. 4.5
At the same time we also know that t  Z  t  Z, but by using restricted modus
ponens rule [under conditions (i)-(ii) mentioned above] we can not conclude that t  Z.
II.From t  Z  t  Z we obtain t  Z  t  Z.We also know that
t  Z  t  Z.So t  Z  t  Z  t  Z.But by the Law of Non-contradiction
we know that t  Z  t  Z.Thus by unrestricted modus tollens we conclude that
t  Z 4.6
and therefore from (4.5)-(4.6) we obtain that t  Z  t  Z but this is a
contradiction.
In order to avoid the contradiction, we set now t  Z  
1 and t  Z  t  Z  
2 ,
and thus by restricted modus tollens we can not conclude that t  Z.Thus finally
we
obtain that only (4.5) holds.Thus by using calculus Pd# with restricted modus ponens
rule
and restricted modus tollens Cantor paradox disappears sinse the inequality V  PV
no longer holds.
Chapter 2.Set Theory INC## Based on Infinitary Intuitionistic
Logic with Restricted Modus Ponens Rule. Hyper inductive
definitions
1.Introduction.
In this chapter intuitionistic set theory INC#
# based on infinitary intuitionistic logic with
restricted modus ponens rule is considered [1]. External induction principle in
nonstandard intuitionistic arithmetic were derived. Non trivial application in number
theory is considered. The Goldbach-Euler theorem is obtained without any references to
Catalan conjecture.
2.Axiom of nonregularity and axiom of hyperinfinity.
2.1.Axiom of nonregularity.
Remind that a non-empty set u is called regular iff
xx   	 y  xx 	 y  . 2.1
Let’s investigate what it says: suppose there were a non-empty x such that
y  xx 	 y  . For any z1  x we would be able to get z2  z1 	 x. Since z2  x we
would be able to get z3  z2 	 x. The process continues forever:
. . . zn1  zn. . . z4  z3  z2  z1  x.Thus we wish to rule out such an infinite regress.
2.1.Axiom of hyperinfinity.
Definition 2.1.(i) A non-empty transitive non regular set u is a well formed non regular
set iff:
(i) there is unique countable sequence unn1
 such that
. . . un1  un. . . u4  u3  u2  u1  u, 2.2
(ii) for any n   and any un1  un :
un  un1
 , 2.3
where a  a 
 a.
(ii) we define a function akinductively by ak1  ak
Definition 2.2. Let u and w are well formed non regular sets. We write w  u iff for any
n  
w  un. 2.4
Definition 2.3. We say that an well formed non regular set u is infinite (or hyperfinite)
hypernatural nuber iff:
(I) For any member w  u one and only one of the following conditions are
satified:
(i) w   or
(ii) w  un for some n   or
(iii) w  u.
(II) Let u be a set u  z|z  u, then by relation 
  
 a set u is densely ordered
with no first element.
(III)   u.
Axiom of hyperinfinity
There exists unique set # such that:
(i)   #
(ii) if u is infinite (hypernatural) number then u  #\
(iii) if u is infinite (hypernatural) number then there exists infinite (hypernatural) number
v
such that v  u
(iv) if u is infinite hypernatural number then there exists infinite (hypernatural) number
w
such that u  w
(v) set #\ is patially ordered by relation 
  
 with no first and no last element.
In this paper we introduced a set #\ of the infinite numbers axiomatically without any
references to non-standard model of arithmetic via canonical ultraproduct approach, see
[2]-[5].
4.Infinitary and hyperinfinitary logics.
4.1.Classical infinitary logic.
By a vocabulary, we mean a set L of constant symbols, and relation and operation
symbols with finitely many argument places. As usual,by an L-structure M , we mean a
universe set M with an interpretation for each symbol of L. In cases where the
vocabulary L is clear, we may just say structure. For a given vocabulary L and infinite
cardinals µ  κ,Lκµ is the infinitary logic with κ variables, conjunctions and disjunctions
over sets of formulas of size less than κ, and existential and universal quantifiers over
sets of variables of size less than µ. All logics that we consider also have equality, and
are closed under negation. The equality symbol is always available, but is not counted
as an element of the vocabulary L.
During last sentury canonical infinitary logic many developed, see for example [6]-[10].
4.2.Why we need infinitary logic
It well known that some classes of mathematical structures, such as algebraically
closed fields of a given characteristic, are characterized by a set of axioms in Lωω. Other
classes cannot be characterized in this way, but can be axiomatized by a single
sentence of Lω1ω.
Remark 4.1.In the practice of the contemporary model theory, and in more general
mathematics as well, it often becomes necessary to consider structures satisfying
certain collections of sentences rather than just single sentences. This consideration
leads to the familiar notion of a theory in a logic. For example, in ordinary finitary logic,
Lωω, if φn is a sentence which expresses that there are at least n elements, then the
theory φn|n  ω would express that there are infinitely many elements. Similarly, in the
theory of groups, if φn is the sentence xxn  1, then ψn : n  ω expresses that a
group is torsion free.
Remark 4.2.Suppose we want to express the idea that a set is finite, or that a group is
torsion. A simple compactness argument would immediately reveal that neither of these
notions can be expressed by a theory in Lωω. What we need to express in each case is
that a certain theory is not satisfied, that is, that at least one of the sentences is false.
While theories are able to simulate infinite conjunctions, there is no apparent way to
simulate infinite disjunctions–which is just what is needed in this case.
Example 4.1. The Abelian torsion groups are the models of a sentence obtained
by taking the conjunction of the usual axioms for Abelian groups (a finite set)
and the following infinite disjunction:
x 
n n
x  x . . .x 0 . 4.1
Example 4.2. The Archimedean ordered fields are the models of a sentence obtained




1  1 . . .1 x . 4.2
Example 4.3. Let L be a countable vocabulary. Let T be an elementary first order
theory, and let Γx be a set of finitary formulas in a fixed tuple of variables x. The
models
of T that omit Γ are the models of the single Lω1ω sentence obtained by taking the




Example 4.4. The non Archimedean ordered fields are the models of a sentence
obtained by taking the conjunction of the usual axioms for non Archimedean ordered




1  1 . . .1 x . 4.4
4.3. Bivalent hyperinfinitary first-order logic IL#
# with
restricted rules of conclusion.
Hyperinfinitary language L#
# are defined according to the length of infinitary
conjunctions/disjunctions as well as quantification it allows. In that way, assuming a
supply of   #  card# variables to be interpreted as ranging over a nonempty
domain, one includes in the inductive definition of formulas an infinitary clause for
conjunctions and disjunctions, namely, whenever the hypernturals indexed
hypersequence A# of formulas has length less than , one can form the hyperfinite
conjunction/disjunction of them to produce a formula. Analogously, whenever an
hypernaturals indexed sequence of variables has length less than 	, one can introduce
one of the quantifiers  or  together with the sequence of variables in front of a formula
to produce a new formula. One also stipulates that the length of any well-formed formula
is less than # itself.
The syntax of bivalent hyperinfinitary first-order logics L#
# consists of a (ordered) set
of sorts and a set of function and relation symbols, these latter together with the
corresponding type, which is a subset with less than #  card# many sorts.
Therefore, we assume that our signature may contain relation and function symbols on
  # many variables, and we suppose there is a supply of   # many fresh
variables of each sort. Terms and atomic formulas are defined as usual, and general
formulas are defined inductively according to the following rules:If 
,,
 :    (for




 	 , x
 (also written x
 if x  x :   ), x
 (also written x
 if
x  x :   ).
The axioms of hyperinfinitary first-order logic L#
# consist of the following schemata:
I. Logical axiom
1. A 	 B 	 A
2. A 	 B 	 C 	 A 	 B 	 A 	 C
3. B 	 A 	 A 	 B
4.  iA 	 A i 	 A 	  i A i,  
#
5.  i A i 	 A j,  
#
6. xA 	 B 	 A 	 xB
provided no variable in x occurs free in A;
7. xA 	 SfA
where SfA is a substitution based on a function f from x to the terms of the language;
II.Restricted rules of conclusion.
R#1.RMP (Restricted Modus Ponens).
From A and A 	 B, conclude B iff A  




We abbraviate by A,A 	 B RMP B.
R#2.MT (Restricted Modus Tollens)
P 	 Q,Q RMT P iff P  





(a) t  t
(b)  i ti  ti
 	 
t0, . . . ,t, . . .  
t0 , . . . ,t , . . .
(c)  i ti  ti
  	 Pt0, . . . ,t, . . . 	 Pt0 , . . . ,t , . . .
for each   #, where t, ti are terms and 
 is a function symbol of arity  and P a
relation symbol of arity   #.
IV.Distributivity axiom:
 i j ij 	  f  i ifi 4.5
V.Dependent choice axiom:
 xx 	 x  4.6
provided the sets x are pairwise disjoint and no variable in x is free in  for
    #.
5.Intuitionistic hyperinfinitary logic L#
# with restricted rules
of conclusion.
We will denote the class of hypernaturals by #, the class of binary sequences of
hypernatural length by 2#, and the class of sets of hypernatural numbers by #.
We fix a class of variables x i for each i  #. Given an   #, a context of length  is
a sequence x  x i j |j   of variables. In this paper we will use boldface letters,
x,y,z,, to denote contexts and light-face letters, x i,y i,zi,, to denote the i-th variable
symbol of x,y, and z, respectively.
We will denote the length of a context x by lx. The formulas of the hyperinfinitary
language #
# of set theory INC#
# are defined to be the smallest class of formulas
closed under the following rules:
1. is a formula,
2.x i  x j is a formula for any variables x i and x j,
3.x i  x j is a formula for any variables x i and x j,
4. if 
 and  are formulas, then 
 	  are formulas,
5. if 
 is a formula for every  :     #, then
1.  
 is a gyperfinite formula, 5.1
6.if 
 is a formula for every  :     #, then
 
is a gyperfinite formula, 5.2
7. if x is a context of length , then x
 is a formula, and,
8. if x is a context of length , then x
 is a formula.
By this definition, our language allows set-sized disjunctions and conjunctions as well
as quantification over set-many variables at once. However, note that infinite alternating
sequences of existential and universal quantifiers are excluded by this definition.
Remark 5.1.Whenever it is clear from the context, we will omit the superscripts from
the quantifiers and write  and  instead of  and , respectively. In many situations it
will be useful to identify a variable x with the context x  x whose unique element is x




”. A variable x i is
called a free variable of a formula 
 whenever x i appears in 
 but not in any
quantification of 
. As usual, a formula without free variables is called a sentence. We
say that x is a context of the formula 
 if all free variables of 
 are among those in x. As
usual, we will write 
x in case that 
 is a formula and x is a context of . Similarly,
given two contexts x and y with x j  y j  for all j  x and j   y, we will write x,y in
case that the sequence obtained by concatenating x and y is a context for .
Remark 5.2. We extend the classical abbreviations as follows: Given a formula 
 and
an hypernatural   # we introduce the bounded quantifiers as abbreviations, namely,
x  y 
 for xx  y 	 
, 5.3
and
x  y 
 for xx  y  
. 5.4
Notation 5.1. A sequent 
 x,  is however equivalent to the formula x
 	 .
The system of axioms and rules for hyperinfinitary intuitionistic first-order logic
consists of the following schemata:
I. Logical axiom
1. A 	 B 	 A
2. A 	 B 	 C 	 A 	 B 	 A 	 C
3.  iA 	 A i 	 A 	  i A i,  
#
4.  i A i 	 A j,  
#
5. xA 	 B 	 A 	 xB
provided no variable in x occurs free in A.
7. xA 	 SfA
where SfA is a substitution based on a function f from x to the terms of the language;
II.Restricted rules of conclusion.
R#1.RMP (Restricted Modus Ponens).
From A and A 	 B, conclude B iff A  




We abbraviate by A,A 	 B RMP B.
R#2.MT (Restricted Modus Tollens)
P 	 Q,Q RMT P iff P  






  i i x  i 
  i 5.5
for each   #.
IV.Frobenius axiom:

  y x y
   5.6
where no variable in y is in the context x.
V.Structural rules:
(a) Identity axiom:





where y is a string of variables including all variables occurring in the string of terms s.
(c) Restricted cut rule:
φ x, ψ,ψ x, θ
φ x, θ
5.9
iff φ  




 x x  x 5.10
(b)
x  y  φx/w z φy/w 5.11
where x,y are contexts of the same length and type and z is any context containing x,y
and the free variables of φ.




φi x, φj 5.12









for each γ  #.
VI.Disjunction axioms and rules:
(a)

j x,  i 
i 5.14







for each   #.
VII. Implication rule:

   x, 















where no variable in y is free in φ.
6.Intuitionistic set theory INC#
# in hyperinfinitary set
theoretical language.
6.1.Axioms and basic definitions.
Intuitionistic set theory INC# is formulated as a system of axioms in the same first
order language as its classical counterpart, only based on intuitionistic logic IL#
# with
restricted modus ponens rule. The language of set theory is a first-order language L#
#
with equality , which includes a binary symbol . We write x  y for  x  y and
x  y for xy. Individual variables x,y,z, . . .of L#
# will be understood as ranging over
classical sets. The unique existential quantifier ! is introduced by writing, for any
formula x,!xx as an abbreviation of the formula xx & yy  x  y.L#
#
will also allow the formation of terms of the form x|x, for any formula  containing
the free variable x. Such terms are called nonclassical sets; we shall use upper case
letters A,B, . . . for such sets. For each nonclassical set A  x|x the formulas
xx  A  x and xx  A  x,Ais called the defining axioms for the
nonclassical set A.
Remark 6.1.Note that the formula xx  A  x,A and
xx  a  x,a  x  u
is not always asserts that xx  A RMP x,A and (or) xx,A RMP x  A even
for a classical set since for some y possible y  A  y RMP y and (or)
y  y  A RMP x  A and y  a  y  y  u RMP y  y  u,etc.In order to
emphasize this fact we sometimes vrite the defining axioms for the nonclassical set in
the
following form xx  A w x,A
Remark 6.2.(1) Two nonclassical sets A,B are defined to be equal and we write A  B
if
xx  A  x  B. (2) A is a subset of B, and we write A 
 B, if xx  A  x  B.
(3) We also write Cl.SetA for the formula uxx  A  x  u. (4) We also write
NCl.SetA for the formulas xx  A  x and xx  A  x,A.
Remark 6.3.Cl.SetA) asserts that the set A is a classical set. For any classical set u,
it follows from the defining axiom for the classical set x|x  u  x that
Cl.Setx|x  u  x.
We shall identify x|x  u with u, so that sets may be considered as (special sorts of)
nonclassical sets and we may introduce assertions such as u  A,u 
 A,u  A, etc.
Remark 6.4.If A is a nonclassical set, we write x  A x,A for xx  A  x,A
and x  Ax,A for xx  A  x,A.
We define now the following sets:
1.u1,u2, . . . ,un  x|x  u1  x  u2 . . .x  un.2. A1,A2, . . . ,An 
 x|x  A1  x  A2 . . .x  An.3.
A  x|yy  A  x  y.
4.	A  x|yy  A  x  y.5.A 
 B  x|x  A  x  B.
5.A 	 B  x|x  A  x  B.6.A  B  x|x  A  x  B.7.u  u 
 u.
8.PA  x|x  A.9.x  A|x,A  x|x  A  x,A.10.V  x|: x  x.
11.  x|x  x.
The system INC#
# of set theory is based on the following axioms:
Extensionality1: uvxx  u  x  v  u  v











Infinity a  a  x  ax  a
Separation1u1u2, . . .unaCl.Setx  a|x,u1,u2, . . . ,un
Separation2u1u2, . . .unNCl.Setx  A|x,A;u1,u2, . . . ,un
Comprehension1u1u2, . . .unAxx  A  x;u1,u2, . . . ,un
Comprehension 2 u1u2, . . .unAxx  A  x,A;u1,u2, . . . ,un
Hyperinfinity: see subsection 2.1.
Remark 6.5.Note that the axiom of hyperinfinity follows from the schemata
Comprehension 2.
7.External induction principle and hyperinductive
definitions.
7.1.External induction principle in nonstandard intuitionistic
arithmetic.
Axiom of infite -induction
(i)
SS   
n
n  S  n  S  S   . 7.1




Fn  Fn  nn  Fn. 7.2
Definition 7.1.Let  be a hypernatural such that   #\. Let 0,  #be a set
such that xx  0,  0  x   and 0,  0,\.
Definition 7.2.(i) Let Fx be a wff of INC#with unique free variable x.We will say that
a wff Fx is restricted on a set S such that S  # iff the following conditions are
satisfied
  #F    S 7.3
and
  #F    #\S. 7.4
(ii) Let Fx be a wff of INC#
# with unique free variable x.We will say that a wff Fx is
a strongly restricted on a set S  # iff the following condition is satisfied
  #F    S 7.5
Definition 7.2. Let Fx be a wff of INC#
# with unique free variable x.We will say that a
wff Fx is unrestricted if wff Fx is not restricted on any set S such that S  #.
Example 7.1.(i) Let fin,  #be a wff formula such that fin    .
Obviously wff fin is a strongly restricted on a set S   since
  #fin    .
(ii) Let ifin,  #be a wff formula such that ifin    #\.Obviously
wff ifin is a strongly restricted on a set #\.
Axiom of hyperfinite induction 1
  #SS  0, 
  0, 
0
  S    S  S  0, .
7.6
Axiom of hyperinfinite induction 1
SS  #   # 
0
  S    S  S  # . 7.7
Remark 7.1.Note that from comprechesion shemata 2 (see subsection 6.1) follows
that
SS  0,   0,   S  
0
  S    S . 7.8
Therefore for any   0, from (7.8) it follows that

0
  S    S    S. 7.9
Thus axiom of hyperfinite induction 1,i.e., (7.6) holds, since from (7.9) it follows that
  0,    S.
Remark 7.2.Note that from comprechesion shemata 2 (see subsection 6.1) follows
that
SS  #  #   S  
0
  S    S . 7.10
Therefore for any   # from (7.10) it follows that

0
  S    S    S 7.12
Thus axiom of hyperinfinite induction 1,i.e., (7.8) holds, since it follows from (7.12)
that   #    S.
Axiom of hyperfinite induction 2
Let Fx be a wff of the set theory INC#
# strongly restricted on a set 0, then
  0, 
0
F  F    0,F. 7.13
Axiom of hyperinfinite induction 2
Let Fx be anrestricted wff of the set theory INC#
# then
  # 
0
F  F    #F. 7.14
Remark 7.3.Note that from comprechesion shemata 2 (see subsection 6.1) follows
that
SS  0,  0,   S  
0
F  F . 7.15
Therefore for any   0, from (7.15) it follows that

0
F  F    S 7.16
Thus axiom of hyperfinite induction 2,i.e., (7.13) holds, since it follows from (7.16)
that   0,    S.
Remark 7.4.Note that from comprechesion shemata 2 (see subsection 6.1) follows
that
SS  #  #   S  
0
F  F . 7.17
Therefore for any   # from (7.17) it follows that

0
F  F    S. 7.18
Thus axiom of hyperinfinite induction 2,i.e., (7.14) holds, since From (7.18) it follows
that    #    S .
Axiom of hyperfinite induction 3
Let Fx be a wff of the set theory INC#
# strongly restricted on inductive set Wind such
that
  Wind  # then
W   Wind  #  
Wind
F  F    WindF. 7.19
Proposition 7.1. (a) For any natural or hypernatural number k  #,
 
0mk
x  m  x  k. 7.20
(a) For any hypernatural number к and any wff B
 
0mk
Bm  xx  k  Bx. 7.21
(b) For any hypernatural number k  # such that k  0,
 
1mk
x  m  1  x  k. 7.22
(b) For any hypernatural number k  # such that k  0 and any wff Bx,
 
0mk1
Bm  xx  k  Bx. 7.23
(c)  xx  y  Bx  xx  y  Ex  xBx  Ex.
Proof. (a) We prove 
0mk
x  m  x  k by hyperfinite induction in the
metalanguage on k. The case for k  0, x  0  x  0, is obvious from the
definitions.
Assume as inductive hypothesis that

0mk




x  m  x  k  1. 7.25
But  x  k  1  x  k  1 and, by the inductive hypothesis,

0mk
x  m. 7.26
Also  x  k  x  k  1. Thus, x  k  1. So,
 
0mk1
x  m  x  k  1. 7.27
Conversely, assume x  k  1. Then x  k  1  x  k  1. If x  k  1, then

0mk1
x  m. 7.28
If x  k  1, then we have x  k. By the inductive hypothesis,

0mk




x  m. 7.30
Thus in either case,

0mk1
x  m. 7.31
This proves
 x  k  1  
0mk1
x  m. 7.32
From the inductive hypothesis, we have derived

0mk1
x  m  x  k  1 7.33
and this completes the proof. Note that this proof has been given in an informal manner
that we shall generally use from now on. In particular, the deduction theorem, the
replacement theorem, and various rules and tautologies will be applied without being
explicitly mentioned.
Parts (a), (b), and (b) follow easily from part (a). Part (c) follows almost immediately
from the statement t  r  t  r  r  t, using obvious tautologies.
There are several stronger forms of the hyperinfinite induction principles that we can
prove at this point.
Theorem 7.1.(Complete hyperinfinite induction) Let Bx be anrestricted wff of the set
theory INC#
# then
xx  #zz  x  Bz  Bx  xx  #Bx 7.34
In ordinary languageI consider a property Bx such that, for any x, if Bx holds for all
hypernatural numbers less than x, then Bx holds for x also. Then Bx holds for all
hypernatural numbers x  #.
Proof.Let Ex be a wff zz  x  Bz.
(i) 1.Assume that xx  #zz  x  Bz  Bx, then
2.zz  0  Bz  B0 it follows from 1.
3. z  0,then
4. zz  0  Bz it follows from 1,
5. B0 it follows from 2,4 by MP
6. zz  0  Bz i.e.,E0 holds it follows from Proposition7.1(a)
7.xx  #zz  x  Bz  Bx  E0 it follows from 1,6 by MP
(ii) 1.Assume that: xx  #zz  x  Bz  Bx.
2.Assume that: Ex  zz  x  Bz, then
3.zz  x  Bz it follows from 2 since z  x  z  x.
4.xx  #zz  x  Bz  Bx it follows from 1 by
rule A4:if t is free for x in Bx, then xBx  Bt.
5. Bx it follows from 3,4 by unrestricted MP rule.
6. z  x  z  x  z  x it follows from definitions.
7. z  x  Bz it follows from 3 by rule A4.
8. z  x  Bz it follows from 5.
9. Ex  zz  x  Bz it follows from 6,7,8,rule Gen.
10.xx  #zz  x  Bz  Bx  xx  #Ex  Ex
it follows from 1,9 by deduction theorem,rule Gen.
Now by (i), (ii) and the induction axiom, we obtain D  xx  #Ex that is
D  xx  #zz  x  Bz, where D  xx  #zz  x  Bz  Bx.
Hence, by rule A4 twice, D  x  x  Bx. But  x  x. So,D  Bx , and, by Gen
and
the deduction theorem, D  xx  #Bx.
Theorem 7.2.(Complete hyperfinite induction) Let Bx be wff of the set theory
INC#
# strongly restricted on inductive set Wind such that   Wind  # then
xx  Windzz  x  Bz  Bx  xx  WindBx 7.35
Proof. Similarly as Theorem 7.1.
Remark 7.5.Remind that the following statement holds in standard bivalent
arithmetic [11]:Least-number principle (LNP)
xBx  yBy  zz  y  Bz. 7.36
In ordinary language:if a property expressed by wff Bx holds for some natural
number n,
then there is a least number satisfying Bx.Obviously LNP (7.23) is not holds in
nonstandard arithmetic, since there is no a least number in a set #\.
Theorem 7.3.(Weak least-number principle) Let Bx be a wff of the set theory
INC#
# such that a wff Bx strongly restricted on inductive set Wind such that
  Wind  # and Wind
  #\Wind then
x x  Wind
 Bx 
y y  Wind
 By  zz  y  Bz  yy  WindBy
7.37
Proof.We assume now that
1.y y  Wind
 By  zz  y  Bz
2.y y  Wind
 By  zz  y  Bz it follows from 1.
3.y y  Wind
 zz  y  Bz  Byit follows from 2 by tautology.
4.yy  WindBy it follows from 3 by Theorem 7.2 with wff By instead wff By
5.y y  Wind
 By  zz  y  Bz  yy  WindBy it follows from
1,4.
Hyperinductive definitions in general.
A function f : # 	 A whose domain is the set # is colled an hyperinfinite sequence
and denoted by fnn# or by fnn#The set of all hyperinfinite sequences whose
terms belong to A is clearly A#; the set of all hyperfinite sequences of n  # terms in A
is An. The set of all hyperfinite sequences with terms in A can be defined as
R  #  A : R is a function n#D1R  n , 7.38
where D1R is domain of R.This definition implies the existence of the set of all
hyperfinite sequences with terms in A.The simplest case is the inductive definition of a
hyperinfinite sequence nn# (with terms belonging to a certain set Z) satisfying the
following conditions:
(a) 0  z,n  en,n,
where z  Z and e is a function mapping Z  # into Z.
More generally, we consider a mapping f of the cartesian product Z  #  A into Z and
seek a function   Z#A satisfying the conditions :
(b) 0,a  ga,n,a  fn,a,n,a,
where g  ZA. This is a definition by induction with parameter a ranging over the set A.
Schemes (a) and (b) correspond to induction “from n to n  n  1”,i.e. n or n,a
depends upon n or n,a respectively. More generally, n may depend upon all
values m where m  n (i.e. m  n). In the case of induction with parameter, n,a
may depend upon all values m,a, where m  n; or even upon all values m,a, where
m  n and b  A. In this way we obtain the following schemes of definitions by
induction:
(c) 0  z,n  h|n,n,
(d) 0,a  ga, n,a  H|n  A,n,a.
In the scheme (c), z  Z and h  ZC#, where C is the set of hyperfinite sequences
whose terms belong to Z; in the scheme (d), g  ZA and H  ZT#A, where T is the set
of functions whose domains are included in #  A and whose values belong to Z.
It is clear that the scheme (d) is the most general of all the schemes considered
above.
By coise of functions one obtains from (d) any of the schemes (a)-(d). For example,
taking the function defined by Hc,n,a  fcn,a,n,a for a  A,n  #,c  Z#A as H in
(d), one obtain (b). We shall now show that, conversely, the scheme (d) can be
obtained from (a). Let g and H be functions belonging to ZA and ZT#A respectively, and
let  be a function satisfying (d). We shall show that the sequence   nn# with
n  |n,A can be defined by (a).Obviously, n  T for every n  #. The first term of
the sequence  is equal to |0,A, i.e. to the set: z  0,a,ga|a  A.The relation
between n, and n is given by the formula:n  n 
 |n  A, where the second
component is
n,a,n,a|a  A  n,a, ,Hn,n,a|a  A. 7.39
Thus we see that the sequence  can be defined by (a) if we substitute T for Z,z for z
and let ec,n  c 
 n,a,Hc,n,a|a  A for c  T.
Now we shall prove the existence and uniqueness of the function satisfying (a). This
theorem shows that we are entitled to use definitions by induction of the type (a).
According to the remark made above, this will imply the existence of functions satisfying
the formulas (b), (c), and (d). Since the uniqueness of such functions can be proved in
the same manner as for (a), we shall use in the sequel definitions by induction of any of
the types (a)-(d).
Theorem 7.4. If Z is any set z  Z and e  ZZ#, then there exists exactly one
hyper sequence  satisfying formulas (a).
Proof. Uniqueness. Suppose that 1nn# and 2nn# satisfy (a) and let
K  n|n  #  1n  2n 7.40
Then (a) implies that K is hyperinductive. Hence # 
 K and therefore 1n  2n.
Existence. Let 	z,n, t be the formula ez,n  t and let w,z,F be the following
formula:
F is a function  D1F  n  F0  z mnFm,m,Fm. 7.41
In other words, F is a function defined on the set of numbers  n  # such that
F0  z and Fm  eFm,m for all m  n  #.
We prove by induction that there exists exactly one function Fn such that n,z,Fn.
The proof of uniqueness of this function is similar to that given in the first part of
Theorem 7.4. The existence of Fn can be proved as follows: for n  0 it suffices to take
0,z as Fn; if n  # and Fn satisfies n,z,Fn, then Fn Fn 
 n,eFnn,n
satisfies the condition n,z,Fn.
Now, we take as  the set of pairs n,s such that n  #,s  Z and

F
n,z,F  s  Fn. 7.42
Since F is the unique function satisfying n,z,F, it follows that  is a function. For
n  0 we have 0  F00  z; if n  #, then n  Fnn  eFnn,n by the
definition of Fn; hence we obtain n  e0,n. Theorem 7.4 is thus proved.
We frequently define not one but several functions (with the same range Z) by a
simultaneous induction:
0  z, 0  t,
n  fn,n,n, n  gn,n,n
where z, t  Z and f,g  ZZZN.
This kind of definition can be reduced to the previous one. It suffices to notice that the
hypersequence n  n,n satisfies the formulas:0  z, t,n  en,n,where
we set
eu,n  fKu,Lu,n,gKu,Fw,n, 7.43
and K,L denote functions such that
Kx,y and Lx,y  y respectively. Thus the function  is defined by induction by
means of (a). We now define  and  by n  Kn,n  Ln.
8.Useful examples of the hyperinductive definitions.
1.Addition operation of gypernatural numbers
The function m,n  m  n : #  # 	 # is defined by
m  0  m,m  n  m  n.
This definition is obtained from (b) by seting Z  A  #,ga  a, fp,n,a  p.
This function satisfies all properties of addition such as: for all m,n,k  #
(i) m  0  m (ii) m  n  n  m (iii) m  n  k  m  n  k.
2.Multiplicattion operation of gypernatural numbers
The function m,n  m  n : #  # 	 # is defined by
m  1  1,m  n  m  n  m.
(i) m  1  1 (ii) m  n  n  m (iii) m  n  k  m  n  k.
4.Distributivity with respect to multiplication over addition.
m  n  k  m  n  m  k.
5. Let Z  A  XX,ga  IX, fu,n,a  u  a in (b). Then (b) takes on the following form
0,a  IX,n,a  n,a  a. 8.1
The function n,a is denoted by an and is colled n-th iteration of the function a :
a0x  x,an

x  anax,x  X,a  XX,n  #. 8.2
6.Let A  #
#
,ga  a0, fu,n,a  u  an .Then (b) takes on the following form
0,a  a0,n,a  n,a  an 8.3





7.Let A  #
#
,ga  a0, fu,n,a  u  an .Then (b) takes on the following form
0,a  a0,n,a  n,a  an 8.5





8. Similarly we define maxinai,mininai,n  #.








b  ai 8.7










ai  bi 8.8





























































Proof. Imediately from Theorem 7.4 and hyperinfinite induction principle.
Definition 8.1.A non-empty non regular sequence unn is a blok corresponding to
gyperfinite number u  u0  #\ iff there is gyperfinite number u such that
. . . un1  un. . . u4  u3  u2  u1  u and the following conditions are
satisfied
. . . un1  un. . . u4  u3  u2  u1  u  u1  u2 . . . un  un1 . . . 8.14
where for any n   : un1  un, where un  un1
 .
Thus beginning with an infinite integer u  #\ we obtain a block (8.20) of infinite
integers.However, given a “block,” there is another block consisting of even larger infinite
integers. For example, there is the integer u  u, where u  k  u  u for each k  . And
v  u  u is itself part of the block:
. . . v  3  v  2  v  1  v  v  1  v  2 . . . 8.15
Of course, v  v  u  v  v, and so forth. There are even infinite integers u  u and uu,
and so forth.Proceeding in the opposite direction, if u  #\, either u or u  1 is of the
form v  v. Here v must be infinite. So there is no first block, since v  u. In fact, the
ordering of the blocks is dense. For let the block containing v precede the one containing
u, that is,
v  2  v  1  v  v  1 . . .. . . u  2  u  1  u  u  1 . . . 8.16 Either u 
v or u  v  1 can be written z  z where v  k  z  u  l for all k, l  .
To conclude our consideration: # consists of  as an initial segment followed by an
ordered set of blocks. These blocks are densely ordered with no first or last element.
Each block is itself order-isomorphic to the integers
 3,2,1,0,1,2,3, 8.17
Although #\ is a nonempty subset of #, as we have just seen it has no least
element and likewise for any block.
9.Analisys on nonarchimedian field #.
9.1.Basic properties of the hyperrationals #.
Now that we have the hypernatural numbers, defining hyperintegers and hyperrational
numbers is well within reach.
Definition 9.1. Let Z  #  #. We can define an equivalence relation  on Z
by a,b  c,d if and only if a  d  b  c. Then we denote the set of all hyperintegers
by #  Z/  (The set of all equivalence classes of Z modulo ).
Definition 9.2. Let Q  #  #  0  a,b  #  #|b  0. We can define an
equivalence relation  on Q by a,b  c,d if and only if a  d  b  c.Then we
denote
the set of all hyperrational numbers by #  Q/  (The set of all equivalence classes
of
Qmodulo ).
Definition 9.3. A linearly ordered set P, is called dense if for any a,b  P such that
a  b, there exists z  P such that a  z  b.
Lemma 9.1. #, is dense.
Proof. Let x  a,b,y  c,d  # be such that x  y.Consider z  ad  bc, 2bd 
#.
It is easily shown that x  z  y.
Remark 9.1.Consider the ring B of all limited (i.e. finite) elements in #. Then B has a
unique maximal ideal I, the infinitesimal numbers. The quotient ring B/I gives the
field
 of the classical real numbers.
1.Let A  #
#
,ga  a0, fu,n,a  u  an .Then (b) takes on the following form
0,a  a0,n,a  n,a  an 9.1





2.Let A  #
#
,ga  a0, fu,n,a  u  an .Then (b) takes on the following form
0,a  a0,n,a  n,a  an 9.3





9.2.Countable summation from gyperfinite sum.
Definition 9.1. Let ann be 
#-valued countable sequence. Let ank
m be any
hyperfinite sequence with m  #\ and such that an  0 if n  #\.Then we define




an  # 9.4





Remark 9.2. Let ann be -valued countable sequence. Note that: (i) for canonical





(ii) the countable summ (-summ ) (9.5) in contrast with (9.6) abviously always exists
even if a series (9.6) diverges absolutely i.e., 
nk

|an |  .










Theorem 9.3. Let 
nk

an  A and 
nk













an  bn  A  B. 9.7
Proof. It follows from Theorem 8.2.




rn,1  r  1. 9.5
It follows from (9.5)
Sr  1 
n1

rn  1  r
n0

rn  1  rSr 9.6
Thus
Sr  11  r
. 9.7








since as we know









10.Euler’s proof of the Goldbach-Euler theorem revisited.


















. . . 10.1
the denominators of which are all numbers which are one less than powers of degree
two or higher of whole numbers, that is, terms which can be expressed with the formula
mn  11, where m and n are integers greater than one, then the sum of this series is
 1.
10.1.How Euler did it.
Euler’s proof begins with an 18th century step that treats any infinite sum as a real
number which may be infinite large. Such steps became unpopular among rigorous
mathematicians about a hundred years later.






















. . . . 10.2
















. . . 10.3
leaving












. . . 10.4













. . . 10.5
leaving
  1  1
2










. . . 10.6









. . . 10.7
leaving










. . . 10.8











. . . 10.9
because the series of powers of 1/4 on the right is already a subseries of the series of
powers of 1/2, so those terms have already been subtracted. This happens because 3 is
one less than a power, 4.It happens again every time we reach a term one less than a
power. He will have to skip 7,because that is one less than the cube 8,and 8 because it
is one less than the square 9,15because it is one less than the square 16, etc.
Continuing formally in this way to infinity, we see that all of the terms on the right
except the term 1 can be eliminated, leaving










. . . 1. 10.10
Thus












. . .  1 10.11
so












. . . 10.12
Remark 10.2.Note that it gets just a little bit tricky. Since  is sum of the harmonic
series, Euler believes that the 1 on the left must equal the terms of the harmonic series
that are missing on the right. Those missing terms are exactly the ones with

















. . . 10.13
where the terms on the right have denominators one less than powers.
10.2. Proof of the Goldbach-Euler theorem using canonical analysis.
We reproduce the proof here for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 1. For any positive integers n and k with 2  n  k
1/n  1  1/n  1n  1/nn  1 ···1/k  1k  1/k
Lemma 2. For any positive integers n and k with n  2
1/n  1  1/n  1/n2 ···1/nk  1/nkn  1
We let denote the n-th harmonic number by Hn :
Hn  1  1/2 1/3. . .1/n, 10.14
but we now think of n as either a finite natural number or an infinite nonstandard
natural number. Let k2 be defined by 2k2  n  2k21. The existence and uniqueness of k2
is clear either if we think of n as a finite natural number or as a nonstandard natural
number: remember the transfer principle. Using Lemma 2, we can write
1  1/2 1/22  123 ···1/2k2  1/2k2·1,
and subtracting this series from (9.14), we obtain
Hn  1  1  1/3 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/9 ···  1/n  1/2k2·1. 10.15
Hence, all powers of two, including two itself, disappear from the denominators, leaving
the rest of integers up to n. If from (10.15) we subtract
1/2  1/3 132  1/33  ···  1/3k3  1/3k3·2, 10.16
again obtained from Lemma 2 with k3 defined by 3k3  n  3k31, the result will be
Hn  1  1/2  1  1/5 1/6 1/7 1/10 ···  1/n  1/2k2·1  1/3k3·2. 10.17
Proceeding similarly we end up by deleting all the terms that remain,arriving finally at
Hn  1  1/2 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/10 ···  1/n 
 1  1/2k2·1  1/3k3·2  ···  1/n·n  1.
10.18
Notice that k2  k3 ···.In fact,when m  n we get km  1.This last expression has
been obtained assuming that n is a nonpower. If n is a power, then 1/n will have
disappeared at some stage of this process,and the last fraction to beremoved
from(10.17) will be 1/n  1, whose denominator is a nonpower unless n  9. (This is
Catalan’s conjecture that 8 and 9 are the only consecutive powers that exist. The
conjecture was recently proved by Miha ilescu []. In fact, it does not matter here whether
there are more consecutive powers or not.) The corresponding expression will thus be
Hn  1  1/2 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/10 ···  1/n  1
 1  1/2k2·1  1/3k3·2  ···  1/n  1·n  2.
10.19
Consequently, if we subtract (10.18) from (10.14) we obtain
1  1/2k2·1  1/3k3·2  ···  1/n·n  1 
1/3 1/7 1/8 1/15 1/24 1/26 ···  1/n  1
10.20
or, correspondingly subtracting (10.19) from (10.14),
1  12k2·1  13k3·2  ···  1/n  1n  2 
1/3 1/7 1/8 1/15 1/24 1/26 ···  1/n,
10.21
sums that containin their denominators,increased by one,all the power so fthe integers
up to n. We must now take care of the “remainder,” that is, the expression between
parentheses above or on the right-hand side of (10.17) (respectively, (10.19)).
Since for each m  2 we know by the definition of km that n  mkm1  m2km , it follows
that n  mkm and
1/mkm ·m  1  1/ n m  1. 10.22
This implies that
1/2k2·1  1/3k3·2  ···  1/n·n  1  Hn1/ n 10.23
or, if n is a power,
1/2k2·1  1/3k3·2  ···  1/n  1·n  2  Hn2/ n  1 . 10.24
If we have chosen to regard n as a finite integer then we can pass to the limit and use
Euler’s asymptotic value for Hn : lim n	 Hn1/ n  lim n	logn  1  γ/ n  0. The
proof is now complete.
10.3.Euler proof revisited using elementary analysis on nonarchimedian field
#.






















. . . .
#
10.22
Remark 10.3.Note that   #\.



















using Theorem 9.3 we obtain




































































using Theorem 9.3 we obtain
  1  12






















































using Theorem 9.3 we obtain
  1  12
 1
4
























because the series of powers of 1/4 on the right is already a subseries of the -sum
(10.23) of powers of 1/2, so those terms have already been subtracted. This happens
because 3 is one less than a power, 4.It happens again every time we reach a term one
less than a power. He will have to skip 7,because that is one less than the cube 8,and 8
because it is one less than the square 9,15because it is one less than the square 16,
etc. Continuing in this way to an gyperfinite number m  #\ by using gyperfinite
induction principle, we see that all of the terms on the right except the term 1 can be
eliminated, leaving














Thus by Theorem 9.3 we obtain



































where the terms on the right have denominators one less than powers.
Note that Eq.(10.32) now is obtained without any references to Catalan conjecture
[13],[14].
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